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Understanding the Essex Junto:
Fear, Dissent, and Propaganda
in the Early Republic
dinah mayo-bobee
ON 7 February 1809, Thomas Jefferson condemned Cong-ress for voting “in a panic” to repeal the embargo that his
administration laid on all shipping in 1807. The government’s
prohibitions on the maritime and overland trades, along with
draconian methods of enforcement provoked intense, some-
times violent opposition in New England. When he expressed
his aggravations to his son-in-law, former congressman Thomas
Mann Randolph (Va.), Jefferson had less than a month remain-
ing in office. Yet, despite the fact that the embargo would
be lifted after he left office, he found New Englanders’ resis-
tance to the law and threats of disunion vexing. In his opinion,
the Essex Junto, an unpatriotic and diabolical political group
operating out of Massachusetts, had orchestrated the “forcible
opposition” that ruined the embargo’s success along with his
last days in office.1
Jefferson’s attribution of the failure of his controversial pol-
icy to one of the era’s most denounced factions did little to
define the Essex Junto or cement its place in history. For the
Dr. Mayo-Bobee wishes to thank the American Antiquarian Society, Philips Library
at the Peabody Essex Museum, Massachusetts Historical Society, Filson Historical Soci-
ety, Library of Congress, the W.E.B. Dubois Library at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst, and the Charles C. Sherrod Library at East Tennessee State University.
1Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph Jr., 7 February 1809, Thomas
Jefferson Papers 1606–1827, Library of Congress http://memory.loc.gov/ammem
/collections/jefferson papers/ (Accessed 18 July 2015) hereafter referred to as Jefferson
Papers.
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most part scholars agree with Jefferson’s analysis despite David
H. Fischer’s article, “The Myth of the Essex Junto.” Fischer
attempted to dispel the notion that ambitious Federalists from
Essex County controlled Federalist Party politics. Fisher ar-
gued that there was not even a single faction of conspirators in
control of Massachusetts politics after the 1750s. Indeed, many
of the Federalists historically associated with the junto, includ-
ing Stephen Higginson and George Cabot of Salem, Francis
Dana and Theophilus Parsons of Boston, and John Lowell of
Newburyport had retired from public life by 1796. By the time
Jefferson sent his complaints to Randolph, the term, Fischer
argues, had become little more than a “universal pejorative,”
uttered as an abstract “symbol of depravity, a synonym for sin.”2
In the decades following the publication of Fischer’s arti-
cle, scholars of early national politics have found it difficult
to dismiss the Essex Junto as myth because the term appears
so frequently in the correspondence, speeches, literature, and
debates of the period. Although some historians unceremo-
niously omit any discussion of the Essex Junto, others feel
compelled to at least mention or provide succinct, albeit vague
definitions. Scholars have depicted the Essex Junto as either an
ultra-conservative wing of New England Federalists, a faction
of North Shore Federalists, elite politicians operating within
Massachusetts’s Federalist Party, or a broadly based group of
Federalist activists whose disruptive influence was national in
scope.3 Any attempt to construct a definitive description or
conclusive interpretation is complicated by the fact that origi-
nal references to the Essex Junto are ambiguous and appear in
2David Hackett Fischer, “The Myth of the Essex Junto,” The William and Mary
Quarterly 3rd. ser, 21 (April 1964): 191–95, 224, 235 (hereafter referred to as WMQ).
3James M. Banner Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins
of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970),
p. 219; Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Com-
pact (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), pp. 30, 31; Marc M.
Arkin, “The Force of Ancient Manners: Federalist Politics and the Unitarian Con-
troversy Revisited,” Journal of the Early Republic 22 (Winter 2002): 580, 601, 609
(hereafter referred to as JER); and Johann N. Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners:
Democracy and Civil Society in Early National Massachusetts (Cambridge, 2008),
p. 62.
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political propaganda and debates long after the Federalist Party
disbanded in the 1820s. Another barrier to reaching an inter-
pretive consensus is the inconsistent geographic and political
orientation of assumed junto politicians. These discontinuities
make it almost impossible to draw a solid conclusion about the
Essex Junto, but it is also true that when they “used the term –
whether seriously or in jest,” as Fischer asserted, Americans
“understood broadly to whom the term applied.”4
To understand the Essex Junto, its meaning in political
rhetoric, and frequent appearance in political propaganda, this
article looks at the evolution of the term that eventually, al-
most naturally, transcended its association with Massachusetts
Federalists. Analyzing developments that shaped perceptions
about what the term represented, why it was used, and to
whom it applied gives us a better grasp of the Essex Junto and
its significance in political discourse from the end of the Revo-
lution through the antebellum period. Accomplishing this goal
requires approaching the topic with a new set of assumptions
while assessing expanded meanings of the Essex Junto over
time.
At the nation’s founding, political leaders were afraid that
secret organizations similar to the subversive factions that cor-
rupted European nations would destroy the new republic. As
soon as representatives from diverse and previously isolated re-
gions of the country met in Congress for the first time, many
condemned what they saw as the formation of clandestine al-
liances or “political combinations” among legislators. Congress-
men began to circulate rumors that a few representatives were
meeting secretly and conspiring to promote or block specific
legislation with sinister intentions. Aghast that dangerous ca-
bals had formed in New Jersey, Virginia, Pennsylvania and
other states, representatives Richard Henry Lee (Va.), Francis
Lightfoot Lee (Va.), and John Collins (R.I.), issued warnings
that similar factions were perpetrating mischief in the national
legislature.
4Fischer, “Myth of the Essex Junto,” p. 225; Arkin, “Force of Ancient Manners,”
p. 580n.
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In 1774, reports that a junto, “mostly of New England men,”
had formed a powerful voting bloc and had identified a specific
threat to republican government. Rhode Island’s David How-
ell complained about the “hood-winking . . . hugger-mugger”
processes that this junto employed to advance a policy agenda
that would usurp the will of the people. Five years later, a
letter repeating this charge appeared on the front page of The
Pennsylvania Evening Post. Credited to Representative Edward
Langworthy (Ga.), the letter publicized the creation of a New
England junto during the First Continental Congress, and in-
formed the public that the group met “regularly . . . to keep
back or obstruct any measure whatever.”5
This indictment compelled Oliver Ellsworth (Conn.) to de-
fend himself and fellow New Englanders in the Connecticut
Courant. First, Ellsworth dismissed Langworthy’s charge that
Congress was “ass-ridden with a junto” as unsubstantiated pro-
paganda. Next, after affirming that no evidence existed to vali-
date the allegation, Ellsworth said it was astonishing that in five
years this group of conspirators “has to this day been kept a
profound secret.” Stephen Higginson (Mass.) joined Ellsworth
in his effort to quash rumors that New Englanders were con-
spiring to establish aristocratic rule. Higginson and Ellsworth
mounted a plausible defense, but detractors continued to pub-
lish articles that reinforced anxieties over factions. Few Ameri-
cans apparently took the New Englanders’ claims of innocence
seriously.6
Once respected politicians tied New Englanders to political
intrigue, they opened the door for conspiracy theorists to target
Massachusetts’ political leaders. Massachusetts was the largest
5John Adams to Hugh Hughes, 4 June 1776 and Samuel Adams to James Warren, 16
April 1776; Richard Henry Lee to Arthur Lee, 24 February 1775, Francis Lightfoot Lee
to Arthur Lee, 22 April 1779, William Shippen to Richard Henry Lee, 22 June 1779,
John Collins to Nathaniel Green 7 September 1779, and David Howell to unknown
recipient, 28 July 1783, and R.I. Delegates to William Green, 8 September 1773, in
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, edited by Paul H. Smith, et al., (26 vols.
Washington, D.C., 1979), 1: 313, 3: 11, 359, 6: 134–35, 12: 369, 13: 100, 467, and 20:
472; Pennsylvania Evening Post, 9 July 1779.
6Jesse Root to Oliver Ellsworth, 8 September 1779, Stephen Higginson to Theodor-
ick Bland and Elbridge Gerry, 6 October 1783, Letters of Delegates, 13: 478–79, 21:
26, 23; Connecticut Courant 10 August 1779.
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Oliver Ellsworth (1745–1807)
Ellsworth of Connecticut, a delegate to the Con-
tinental Congress and Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787, US Senator, and Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court (1796–1800) defended fellow
New Englanders against allegations that they were
conspiring to take control of the nation. Courtesy
of the U.S. Senate Historical Office, Library of
Congress.
and most radical colony at the start of the Revolution, and both
John and Samuel Adams were forced to temper their passions
for independence because so many in the Continental Congress
mistrusted their motives. To avoid risking the Patriot cause,
Samuel Adams recommended proposing their ideas “by means
of other persons.” The cousins decorated the background while
Virginians advanced their strategies. Through the use of surro-
gates, they shrewdly eased the trepidations of many who were
reluctant to sever ties with Britain or join a confederation of
states if it was led by Massachusetts.7
7Adams quoted in John Ferling, A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create
the American Republic, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 114, 115;
Theophilus Parsons to John Waite, Esq., 19March 1776 in Theophilus Parsons,Memoir
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Instead of dispelling doubts that other states had about
Massachusetts, however, distrust of the state’s representatives
became more pronounced after independence. In fact, person-
ality clashes, competing economic interests, and policy disputes
even created divisions and an air of uneasiness within the state.
In 1781, his final year in Congress, Samuel Adams cautioned
voters to exercise the franchise diligently and carefully in order
to avert the collusions of a junto trying to “change the love of
liberty into the spirit of faction.”8 Within a decade of Adams’s
warning, politicians in his state and across the nation would
subscribe to the notion that the source of anti-democratic, anti-
republican schemes was a junto based in Essex County.
Essex was not chosen randomly. In 1776, county leaders
had complained that wealth should entitle them to more rep-
resentation in the state legislature. Two years later, after the
General Court drafted a new state constitution and sent it to
the counties for approval, Essex prepared a point-by-point cri-
tique of the proposed government. At irregular intervals, “The
Essex Result,” proposed revisions such as a bill of rights, but
more often, it digressed into a treatise on government praising
political equality but reserving governance for “gentlemen of
education, fortune, and leisure.”9
Revolutionaries in Massachusetts found the rationalization
for rule by a “natural aristocracy” disconcerting. Essex County
spokesmen were not Loyalists, but their views reflected To-
ryism nonetheless. Claims that factions in and around Boston
favored social stratification and royalist pretensions seemed ir-
refutable. Theophilus Parsons’s son theorized that the Essex
Result was, “one of the grounds-perhaps the chief one-for that
nickname of ‘The Essex Junto.’” Parsons, who is credited with
of Theophilus Parsons Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
(Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1859), p. 40.
8Samuel Adams to the Public, 13 March 1781, Letters to Delegates, 27: 56; Mas-
sachusetts Centinel 18 and 25 May 1785; Independent Chronicle 24 March 1785;
Banner, Hartford Convention, pp. 123, 124.
9“Essex County Convention, Ipswich, 25 and 26 April 1776, and “The Essex Result,
1778,” in Oscar and Mary Handlin, The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Doc-
uments on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 73–75, 324–65.
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writing the Essex Result, was as proud of the sobriquet as “of
any political distinction” and accordingly “held on to it to the
end of his life.”10
Between the end of war in 1783 and the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, factions in Massachusetts were on the verge
of maturing into political parties. Perhaps the most meaning-
ful indication of this was the breakdown of civil order during
the postwar economic downturn. As the maritime interests in
the coastal areas toyed with protective tariffs, agriculturalists
in the west lacked a similar plan for economic recovery. When
the General Court rejected efforts to pass debt relief, farm-
ers questioned the governor’s high salary, as well as the profits
earned by costal investors and speculators at the same time
that they faced imprisonment and confiscation of their property
when they could not pay their taxes. Distrust for the leadership
in Boston, monetary reforms that exacerbated their financial
distress, and heavy handed tax collecting tactics, sparked rebel-
lions led by Samuel Ely and Daniel Shays in 1782 and 1786–87
respectively.11
Symptomatic of a larger, national problem, the solution
among elites was a stronger central government under a new
constitution. Yet, just as they had resisted the centralized au-
thority in Boston, western agriculturalists opposed ratification
in 1788. By some estimates, the Antifederalist opponents of
ratification in Massachusetts outnumbered the Constitution’s
Federalist supporters. Furthermore, the Antifederalists’ appre-
hensions were strengthened by revolutionary leader Samuel
Adams’s initial objection to ratification. Most likely, they also
recalled that only a few years earlier Adams warned them about
junto plots to destroy the republic and democratic freedoms.
To Adams the new Constitution did just that.12
10Parsons, Memoir, p. 48.
11Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins
of the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 108–21,
132, 137; Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2007), pp. 31, 32, 38, 88.
12See Ferling, A Leap in the Dark, pp. 296–301; Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York: First Vintage Books
Edition, 1997), pp. 119–21.
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The Antifederalists’ influence waned after John Hancock an-
nounced his support for ratification at the same time that
Federalists manipulated the press and issued fabricated en-
dorsements to increase popular support for the Constitution.
Following ratification, fears that the proponents of big gov-
ernment would surreptitiously establish an aristocracy were
reignited when voters sent a Federalist majority to Congress.
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s economic plans,
couched in open admiration for the British, contributed to this
perception and the formation of the Democratic-Republican
Party with its unyielding condemnation of Federalists and the
suppression of their party.13
The new party frequently criticized Federalists in the parti-
san press for Hamilton’s Anglophile economics, Jay’s treaty with
Britain, and the Alien and Sedition Acts. Following Jefferson’s
lead, Democratic-Republicans wrote or hired others to write
damaging, sometimes incendiary, articles that censured the Es-
sex Junto for trying “to sap the republic by fraud, if they cannot
destroy it by force, & to erect an English monarchy in it’s [sic]
place.” Federalist Party support began to atrophy in the South
because of the Essex Junto and New England Federalists’ calls
to repeal the three-fifths clause, the Constitution’s provision for
counting slaves in the calculation for congressional representa-
tives. But Federalists also faced challenges in the New England
and the Mid-Atlantic states because of their identification with
the pro-British, antidemocratic Essex Junto. In Massachusetts
Democratic-Republicans implemented Jefferson’s struggle to
“strip of all the means of influence the Essex junto, & their
associate monocrats.”14
Through the 1790s, the Essex Junto applied narrowly to
Massachusetts Federalists who were considered the enemies
of democracy. Most were aware of the damage that this image
13Massachusetts Centinel, 7 March 1789; Ferling, Leap in the Dark, pp. 300, 307;
David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist
Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 249;
Boston Gazette, 2 and 23 March 1789; Herald of Freedom, 20 March 1789; Boston
Constitutional Telegraphe, 12 April 1800.
14Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 11 July 1801, Jefferson Papers.
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was inflicting on their party. Former Congressman Fisher Ames
of Dedham, Massachusetts made glib references to this prob-
lem in a letter dated 16 February 1801. To Jeremiah Smith,
Ames wrote facetiously, “thank you for early asking my influ-
ence, which as one of the Essex Junto, you know is great.” Not
intending for Smith to take his reference seriously, he added
sardonically, “It is bold of you, sinner that you are, to ask any
thing of me.” Ames was not from Essex County and had retired
from Congress in 1796 because of a chronic, debilitating respi-
ratory ailment. Ames vacillated over the Federalist Party’s abil-
ity to reclaim power after losing the presidency and Congress
in 1800, but his moments of doubt were well founded. Ames
belied stories of the Essex Junto’s influence when criticizing
his party’s lack of unity. “Party is an association of honest men
for honest purposes . . . But the federalists [sic] are scarcely
associated” Ames admitted. He was sure that it would take in-
dividual perseverance to “prevent the dissolution of the feeble
ties by which the federal party is held together.”15
Before writing his tongue-in-cheek letter to Smith, Ames dis-
cussed the gap between perceptions about an Essex Junto and
its actual political influence as the Federalists’ squabbled over
John Adams’s reelection in 1800. He correctly predicted that
Adams’s supporters would blame the amorphous junto instead
of Democratic-Republicans for losing the election and urged
Hamilton to avoid “dividing the party” by supporting Adams.
Despite rumors that he led the Essex Junto, Ames could not
keep Hamilton from attempting to destroy Adams’s chances for
reelection. Even as trade restrictions began to raise the ire of
New England’s mariners in 1806, Ames had to urge congres-
sional Federalists to participate in debates over the future of
commerce. Any influence that Ames had was severely limited.
Nevertheless, years after his death in 1808, political enemies
were still calling Ames the “oracle of the Essex Junto.”16
15Ames to Thomas Dwight 15 August 1800, Ames to Jeremiah Smith 16 February
1801, Ames to Theodore Dwight 19 March 1801, Fisher Ames, Works of Fisher Ames:
With a Selection From His Speeches and Correspondence, ed. Seth Ames, 2 vols. (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1969), 1:280, 292, 293.
16John W. Malsberger, “The Political Thought of Fisher Ames,” JER 2 (Spring,
1982): 10, 11; Ames to Alexander Hamilton, 26 August 1800, Ames to Josiah Quincy, 19
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Unlike Ames most Federalists were not cavalier about being
associated with the Essex Junto. In the heated political cli-
mate of the late 1790s and early 1800s, some of them tried to
stem the tide of accusations that they were part of a conspiracy
to overthrow the government. They struck back, claiming that
their political opponents had created this imaginary junto and
issued baseless accusations in order to exploit the public’s fear
of plots and intrigues.17 But Democratic-Republicans contin-
ued to inspire fear with skill and success through propaganda.
Characterizing Federalists as threats to the Union also helped
Jeffersonians win elections.
Propaganda was not the only problem that affected Feder-
alists at the polls. From 1788 through 1800, their elitism and
cliquishness compounded accusations of aristocratic designs.
Federalists spouted elitist viewpoints in public but privately
differed little from their Democratic-Republican opponents.
Members of both parties exchanged ideas about policy and
strengthening the republic, partnered in business, intermar-
ried, and promoted the wealthy, well-versed for political of-
fice. The most notable exception was Timothy Pickering, an
Essex County politician who actually did devise a plan for dis-
union. A former secretary of state, U.S. senator, and repre-
sentative, Pickering opposed the three-fifths clause and said
that it was in New England’s best interests to form a repub-
lic separate from the slave states. Convinced that New En-
gland could do “nothing to countervail the power and influence
arising from the Negro representation,” Pickering calculated
that if Massachusetts, “the most powerful” state took the lead
the rest of New England, followed by the Mid-Atlantic States
would secede and then form a Northern Confederation free
March 1806, and Ames to Timothy Pickering, 24 March 1806, in Ames, Works, 1:280–
81, 371–72, 373–74 and 2:204–10, 322–34; Salem Gazette 18 July 1800; Newburyport
Herald 25 July 1800, Windsor Vermont Republican, 7 April 1817; and Boston Patriot,
27 May 1809. Fischer, “Myth of the Essex Junto,” pp. 195, 196, 211.
17Fischer, “Myth of the Essex Junto,” p. 192; Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: First Vintage Book Edition,
2008), pp. 10, 12–14; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party
Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 205, 286.
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Timothy Pickering (1745–1829)
Pickering suggested that New England secede
and form a Northern Confederacy because he
opposed slave representation. He protested
the embargo of 1807 and embraced a sep-
arate peace with Britain during the War of
1812. He was considered a leader of the Essex
Junto. Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical
Office, Library of Congress.
of slavery.18 His plan failed, but when Pickering’s plans
were exposed they confirmed what many Americans already
believed—Essex County Federalists were still plotting to de-
stroy the Union. No assertions to the contrary would erase this
perception.
Despite Pickering’s notoriety and the Federalist Party’s dam-
aged image, younger politicians were still attracted to it. Propa-
gandists wasted no time linking newcomers, especially if they
were outspoken, to the Essex Junto. Jeffersonian Benjamin
Austin described the “Alarms, terror, threatening, and fraud”
by which the junto “assailed the good sense of the people.”
18Timothy Pickering to George Cabot, 29 January 1804, Pickering Papers, Mas-
sachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; Kevin M. Gannon “Escaping ‘Mr. Jef-
ferson’s Plan of Destruction’: New England Federalists and the Idea of a Northern
Confederacy, 1803–1804” JER 21 (Autumn 2001): 413–16.
634 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY
Like other secret societies the junto’s “choice spirits” recruited
members and inducted them into their organization with se-
cret rituals while “sycophants” intimidated “the lower class of
the community.” Austin said he could prove that this “self-
aggrandizing faction” was responsible for “all the virulence of
parties . . . including ocean massacres, illuminati, &c.”19 When
Federalists began to protest trade restrictions during Jeffer-
son’s second term, to onlookers they confirmed association with
the Essex junto. Indeed, opposition to Democratic-Republican
legislation became the litmus test for membership in the Es-
sex Junto. When resistance to their policies surfaced outside
of Massachusetts, Jeffersonians explained that the junto had
grown powerful enough to influence people in Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina.20
Federalists could not dispel the public’s perceptions or create
a comparable beˆte-noir to challenge Democratic-Republicans.
During the French Revolution they accused Democratic-
Republicans of participating in a Bavarian Illuminati conspir-
acy to topple the US government. The effort failed, because
as historian Gordon Wood explains, “throughout the 1790s the
Republicans had accused them of just this sort of deception.”
Federalists charges that a Democratic-Republican conspiracy
was afoot looked retaliatory and inane coming from politicians
linked to the Essex Junto. In the end the charges gained no
traction.21
On the other hand, Democratic-Republicans had found that
generating panic over secret plots was an extremely effective
way to chisel away at the Federalist support base while they
were in power. Once Federalists were voted out of power
19Benjamin Austin, Constitutional Republicanism, in Opposition to Fallacious Fed-
eralism (Boston: Adams & Rhoades, 1803), pp. 16–17, 50.
20Fischer, “Myth of the Essex Junto,” pp. 197, 199, 205, 235; William Sullivan,
Familiar Letters of Public Characters and Public Events; From the Peace of 1783
to the Peace of 1815 (Boston: Russell, Odiorne, and Metcalf, 1834), pp. 97–99, 171;
Charles Raymond Brown, The Northern Confederacy: According to the Plans of The
“Essex Junto” 1796–1814 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915), pp. 18, 19,
110–17.
21Gordon S. Wood, “Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in
the Eighteenth Century,” WMQ 3rd ser., 39 (Jul., 1982): 433–34.
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and relegated to minority status in Congress, Democratic-
Republicans continued to issue accusations about the junto
to discredit any opposition message they might devise. For this
reason during the Embargo of 1807, instead of dealing with the
economic causes of lawbreaking and protests, Jefferson and his
party simply blamed the Essex Junto.22
Representations of monsters or grotesque figures in art and
the “public mind,” were, as one art historian argues, “a sign
of political change.” For this reason, caricatures of the Essex
Junto began to surface most frequently during periods of po-
litical upheaval. In The Essex Junto; or Quixotic Guardian, a
play published in 1802, J. Horatio Nichols personified the mon-
strous nature of the junto by dramatizing a fictional account of
the Federalist Party to steal the presidency during Adams’s final
days in office. Nichols’s title character in most scenes accom-
panies “Cockade” representing Federalists who, in connivance
with “the Duke of Braintree” (Adams) plot to overthrow the
federal government and keep “Monticello” (Jefferson) from
becoming president. Beleaguered by mutual mistrust and in-
ternecine squabbling, the villains have problems executing their
plan. When fellow conspirator, “General Creole” (the standing
army) decides not to assassinate the “Old Patriot” (republican
government), the plan falls apart. Eventually, Monticello and
“Whig” (Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican allies), thwart the
coup d’e´tat and save the republic. Deeply embedded corrup-
tion dooms Adams to obscurity and the Federalist Party to
disgrace. Through it all, the title character remains undaunted.
The Essex Junto, devoid of patriotism, virtue, or courage, vows
to unleash an unrelenting barrage of venomous attacks on the
Jefferson administration with “a scorpion’s sting . . . [and] a
frightful hissing.”23
22See Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 11 July 1801; John Adams, 20 April 1812, 10 August
1815; John Melish, 13 January 1813; and William Short, 8 January 1825, Jefferson
Papers; Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 913, 916–18.
23Wendy Bellion, “Patience Wright’s Transatlantic Bodies,” in Maurie D. McInnis
and Louis P. Nelson, eds., Shaping the Body Politic: Art and Political Formation in
Early America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), pp. 37, 38; J. Horatio
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Nichols’s understanding of political issues is evident in his
treatment of the Quasi War, Adams’s treaty with France, and
the Jeffersonians’ presumption that Federalists planned to seize
power after the election of 1800. On the other hand, Nichols
links Federalists with every perceived threat to the Union—
including slavery. He depicts Adams as a slave owner, Fed-
eralists as fugitive slave hunters who return the unfortunate
to bondage, and Jefferson as an abolitionist. Despite its obvi-
ous mischaracterizations, however, the play correctly captures
the internal disorganization that plagued the Federalist Party
throughout its existence.24
Most importantly, “Essex Junto,” though unpopular and per-
manently banished from the circles of power, would not let
the nation prosper under Jeffersonian rule. When personified
in this way, it was not necessary to provide details about junto
policies or methods of operation. And while not depicted as
physically grotesque, the character Essex Junto was unattrac-
tive, bellicose, and irrationally opposed to Jefferson’s admin-
istration. This portrayal gave partisans in the press, Congress,
and the literary world leave to disparage and dismiss any Fed-
eralist grievance as another divisive and sinister machination of
the Essex Junto.25
Despite the ephemeral nature of such charges, each attack
in the press put Federalists further on the defensive. Satirist
Thomas Fessenden assailed the Democratic-Republican evo-
cation of the Essex Junto as “one of the bugbears” or phan-
toms Jeffersonians used to “frighten the babes and old women.”
Equating propaganda about the junto to “gun-powder plots,”
he declared “The men whom they would designate as an Essex
Nichols, The Essex Junto; or Quixotic Guardian A Comedy in Four Acts By a Citizen
of Massachusetts (Salem: Nathaniel Coverly, 1802), pp. 11, 12, 67–71.
24James E. Lewis Jr., “ ‘What is to Become of Our Government?’ The Revolutionary
Potential of the Election of 1800,” and Michael A. Bellesiles, “ ‘The Soil Will be Soaked
With Blood’: Taking the Revolution of 1800 Seriously,” in James Horn, et al., eds.,
The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic, (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2002), pp. 3–29, 59–86; Nichols, Essex Junto, pp. 45, 46,
49, 52, 53.
25Nichols, Essex Junto, pp. 11, 53.
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Junto, are as much interested in the preservation of a Republi-
can government, as any men in the community, and would, by
the introduction of a Monarchial government, dig a pit for their
own destruction.”26 While Fessenden denied the existence of
“an Essex Junto,” rumors of conspiracy were not easily quashed
and denials were even less effective when Federalists, through
their own actions, transformed perceptions into reality.
Indeed, while Pickering did devise a plan for northern dis-
union following Jefferson’s reelection in 1804, the call took
on greater urgency during the embargo on all shipping that
lasted from 1807 through 1809. He and others claimed that
the policy was part of a southern conspiracy to diminish
New England’s political influence and economic independence.
Anti-embargo protests dovetailed with the Federalists’ cam-
paign to end the use of slaves in congressional representation
and arrest the growth of southern political influence. Jeffer-
sonians soon conflated these messages, which added a sec-
tional dimension to the campaign against the Essex Junto.
Democratic-Republican Nathaniel Ames, Fisher Ames’s older
brother, wrote that the “Northern States [are] nearly in open
rebellion against Congress and Southern States.” Since Jeffer-
sonians were unwilling to repeal the embargo, disunion, argued
the Federalist Newburyport Herald, was the only alternative to
the Democratic-Republicans’ legislative crusade to ruin New
England’s economy. When Congress finally repealed the policy,
Federalist James Bayard of Delaware observed that lifting the
embargo “was designed as a concession to our eastern brethren
. . . that the union may still be preserved.”27
Of course, Democratic-Republicans promulgated a very dif-
ferent interpretation. They asserted that the embargo failed
26Thomas Green Fessenden [Christopher Caustic, pseud.], Democracy Unveiled,
or Tyranny Stripped of the Garb of Patriotism (New York: Riley & Co., 1806), p. 74.
27Banner, Hartford Convention, pp. 115–16; Fischer, American Conservatism, pp.
175, 176; Ames quoted in Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto or Early American
Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, 1758–1822 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1931), p. 233; Newburyport Herald, 14 February 1806 and 14 March
1806 [Italics theirs]; James A. Bayard, Mr. Bayard’s Speech Upon His Motion to Amend
the Resolution Delivered in the Senate of the United States Tuesday, February 14, 1809
(Portland: Printed at the Gazette Office by Arthur Shirley, 1809), p. 17.
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because members of the Essex Junto seduced the unwary into
violating and protesting the law as part of a scheme to dismantle
the Union. The junto, after polluting all of New England had
managed to rouse anti-embargo hostilities in the Mid-Atlantic
States as well. Jeffersonian leaning newspaper correspondents
retrieved language of the Revolution and denounced the Essex
Junto as the heirs of Tories who advocated disunion, creation of
a New England confederacy, and the restoration of monarchial
government.28
William Bentley of Salem, an Essex County Democratic-
Republican, reflects the power of anti-junto propaganda in his
diary. In 1800, Bentley mentioned the junto casually after not-
ing its brief mention in a local newspaper. Between 1808 and
1809, however, as the Democratic-Republican press reported
incidents of rabid protests and violations of the embargo, his
disdain deepened. After reading of the Federalists’ bellicose
opposition to the embargo in the House of Representatives,
Bentley added Josiah Quincy of Boston, to his personal list of
Essex Junto politicians. When Bentley made this connection
Federalists had not recaptured support in New England and
decades would pass before Quincy would become the mayor
of Boston and President of Harvard. Finally, riots and threats
of disunion demonstrated that the crisis had reached a boiling
point, and moved Bentley to grumble, “Nothing can exceed the
effrontery of the party called the Essex Junto.”29
Years after the crisis over the embargo had passed and the
presidency was behind him, Jefferson modified his views of
the Essex Junto. While they all had an affinity for Britain,
most of the Essex Junto, he now believed, did “not aim at
separation.”30 Jefferson never focused on exposing the identi-
ties of Essex Junto politicos because he presumed they were
28Fischer, American Conservatism, pp. 2–5, 249, 255. Paul Goodman, The
Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in A Young Republic (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 102.
29William Bentley, Diary of William Bentley, D.D. Pastor of the East Church Salem,
Massachusetts, 4 vols. (Salem: Essex Institute, 1911), 2:343, 3:376, 415.
30Jefferson to John Melish, 13 January 1813, Jefferson Papers; Fischer, “Myth of
the Essex Junto,” pp. 231, 232.
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well known. Newspapers had described Fischer Ames as the
“idol” of the Essex Junto and no one doubted that Pickering
was its most highly placed member.31 But most Democratic-
Republicans considered all Federalists disunionists, and unlike
Jefferson who never focused on specific identities of Essex
Junto members, they felt the need to locate and chronicle such
persons.
During one of several heated House debates over the em-
bargo, John Wayles Eppes of Virginia, Jefferson’s other son-
in-law, became angry over the Federalists’ revived popularity
in New England. He harangued them for opposing the em-
bargo but trained most of his fire on Senator Pickering, whose
widely published anti-embargo letter to Massachusetts Gover-
nor James Sullivan undermined the policy. What was worse,
complained Eppes, was that a sitting senator was also head of
“a party connected and known under the name of the Essex
Junto.” Instead of being concerned, Pickering considered it a
compliment to be included with other alleged members of the
Essex Junto, and deemed it “my highest honor to have those
gentlemen for my friends.”32
Governor Sullivan, the recipient of Pickering’s letter, sang
loudly in the chorus of Essex Junto alarmists. After accusing
Pickering of attacking the embargo to appease the British, Sul-
livan cautioned Jefferson, “I believe that the . . . Essex Junto,
commonly called federalists, here shall overthrow the present
administration subvert the principles of the national govern-
ment, [and] divide the Union.” Earlier, the easily excitable Sul-
livan told James Monroe, then ambassador to Britain, that Bay
State Federalists and their surrogates in Connecticut and New
Hampshire were conspiring to divide the country into “three
empires.” Monroe tried to allay Sullivan’s fears by assuring him
that disunion plots “require only to be known to be defeated.”
At any rate, successful negotiations with Britain would expose
31Essex Register 27 May 1809; Banner, To the Hartford Convention, p. 43.
32Annals of Congress, 10th Cong., 2d sess. 954; Timothy Pickering, A Letter From
the Hon. Timothy Pickering . . . (Portsmouth: William Treadwell, 1808); Pickering to
George Henry Rose, Esq., 22 March 1808, Pickering Papers [Italics theirs].
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any “artful & unprincipled men at home” even those “in the
first stages of the treason.” But by the time Jefferson left of-
fice, more Democratic-Republicans sounded like Sullivan than
Monroe and determined that Federalists’ opposition to the em-
bargo was a pernicious effort by the Essex Junto to destroy the
republic.33
Federalists charged President Madison and congressional
Democratic-Republicans with initiating the War of 1812 de-
spite a lack of preparation. This was the case, and Democratic-
Republicans had also resisted bipartisan solutions before the
war and held Federalists responsible for protracting the con-
flict with Britain by criticizing their decision to declare war. The
“Creed of the Essex Junto” claimed that Federalists had never
been loyal to the United States, which is why they complained
that “Madison can’t do anything right.” Yet, the problem for the
junto, according to the Jeffersonian pamphlet, was “not that the
president was a bungler, but that he was not an apologist for
Britain and was not a Tory during the Revolution!” Essex Junto
politicians were, which explains why they questioned the gov-
ernment’s decision to go to war with Great Britain.34
Even though news traveled slowly, their stance during the
war confirmed the Federalists’ disloyalty in much of the coun-
try. Nevertheless, in New England the Madison Administration
found it difficult, and in some areas impossible, to rally support
for the war. Democratic-Republicans denounced the entire re-
gion and placed leading New Yorkers in the Essex Junto when
they began to oppose the war.35 Nor did they forget Pickering,
who along with his nephew, Samuel Williams, was at the center
of a controversy for allegedly conferring with the British. The
poem, Pickeroniad, dedicated “to all who are not such fools as
33James Sullivan to Thomas Jefferson, 2 April 1806, Jefferson Papers; James Mon-
roe, The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton 7 vols. (New York:
AMS Press, 1969), 4:481–85; Jonathan Russell, The Whole Truth, or, the Essex Junto
Exposed, (Boston: Office of the Public Advertiser, 1808), pp. 25, 27.
34Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1995), pp. 19–28; “Creed of the Essex Junto,” Independent Chronicle,
15 February 1810.
35City Gazette and Daily Advertiser 24 February 1810; Boston Patriot, 14 May
1814.
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to be led by the Proboscis, the Essex Junto” charged antiwar
Federalists with committing treason for monetary gain. As for
Pickering, “[S]earch the page of ancient hist’ry through/so black
a traitor will not meet your view.”36
The pamphlet Essex Junto and the British Spy; or, Treason
Detected went even further when claiming that activities of the
Essex Junto had been a justification for the war. Comprised
of “a body small in numbers but powerful in talents, wealth
and intrigue,” junto leaders were “bent on the subversion of
civil liberty, to secure themselves crowns and titles of nobility,
regardless of the consequences to severing the Union.” William
Duane, editor of the Philadelphia Aurora and Tammany Hall
Jeffersonian Benjamin Romaine heaped similar denunciations
on the Essex Junto for wartime perfidy.37
Federalists had planned to and did weaken the nation’s war
effort because they questioned the governing party’s motives
for war from the beginning. Suggestions from Pickering and
others that New Englanders should negotiate a separate peace
with Britain to preserve the older regions of the Union by
separating them from new states and territories in the West
confirmed that the danger of disunion was ever-present. If
left unchecked the Essex Junto could reverse the results of
the Revolution. To a majority of Americans, dissension during
the War of 1812 demonstrated the depths to which the Essex
Junto would sink to destroy the Union.38 It also proved that
their swelling angst over the Union’s survival was justified.
Madison won reelection in 1812 despite the fact that Fed-
eralists joined dissident Democratic-Republicans in New York,
New Jersey, and Delaware to support DeWitt Clinton (N.Y.).
36Jefferson to John Adams, 20 April 1812, Jefferson Papers; Ralpho Risible [pseud.],
The Pickeroniad: or Exploits of Faction . . . (Newburyport: Wright, 1811), pp. 12, 17,
35, 36 [Italics theirs].
37John Henry, The Essex Junto and the British Spy: or Treason Detected (Salem:
n.p., 1812), p. 2; William John Duane, The Law of Nations, Investigated in a Popular
Manner, (Philadelphia: Printed by William Duane, 1809), p. 631; Benjamin Romaine,
Tammany Society, No. 1, Twenty-fourth Anniversary Address, New York, Season of
Bloom, 12th May, 1813 (New York: n.p., 1813), p. 10.
38Banner, Hartford Convention, 110, 112; Hickey, War of 1812, pp. 159–81; Russell,
Whole Truth. p. 25.
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The election results were not close (128 to 89 electoral votes),
but considering the fact that Madison was a wartime president
whose major challenger was from the same party, Clinton came
too close for comfort. Before the election Clinton criticized
Jefferson, Madison, and southerners in Congress for taking out
their hostilities against the commercial north through the em-
bargo and other trade restrictions. His uncle, George Clinton,
Jefferson’s vice president and a former governor of New York,
shared this opinion, insisting that the Virginians’ chief con-
cern was not protecting commerce, but keeping slaves “from
cutting their Masters throats.” A good number of Federalists
threw their support behind Clinton, the “peace party” candi-
date. When he accepted their endorsement, Steven Edwin Siry
points out, the alliance precipitated “the bitter climax of his
national political aspirations and the beginning of Clinton’s
unjustified obscurity and denigration in American political
history.”39
For this act of apostasy, Madison’s supporters labeled Clin-
ton the “New-York and Essex Junto candidate.”40 In an article
questioning his patriotism, the Richmond Enquirer dispraised
Clinton, calling him “a catspaw in the hands of the Essex
Junto” who would destroy the Union if elected. Democratic-
Republicans attacked Clinton nationwide for fraternizing with
Federalists. “It is currently said, as we have understood in
federal articles in New-England, that if they could gain the
co-operation of the state of New York they would recede
from the Union; Is it not the great object of the Essex Junto
in supporting Mr. Clinton to gain this Co-operation?” asked
Charleston’s City Gazette.41
39Clinton quoted in Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and
Southern Domination, 1780–1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2000), pp. 63–67; Siry, “Sectional Politics,” pp. 455–58; Hickey, War of 1812, pp.
100–105.
40Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., 2d sess. 256; Steven Edwin Siry, “Sectional
Politics of ‘Practical Republicanism’: De Witt Clinton’s Presidential Bid, 1810–1812,”
JER 5 (Winter 1985): 441–62.
41Public Advertiser [NY], 26 August 1812; for similar comments see, Pittsfield Sun
or Republican Monitor, 22 October 1812; Richmond Enquirer, 21 August 1812; City
Gazette and Daily Advertiser [Charleston], 11 September 1812.
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Clinton previously condemned the Essex Junto and Fed-
eralists in general for allegedly colluding with “the British
Ministry” on a regular basis. Like Milton’s fallen angel Beelze-
bub, the junto considered it “better to reign in hell than
serve in heaven.” Unable to win an election “through honest
means,” junto affiliates would rather “regain office and eleva-
tion through blood, destruction, and general ruin than not to
obtain them at all.” It was not until his plans clashed with
those of his party’s southern leadership that former colleagues
unearthed the deep-rooted “intrigues” that they claimed Clin-
ton had been perpetrating his entire career. “If any doubt re-
mains of the truth of the character . . . of De Witt Clinton,”
wrote one editorialist, “you have a confirmation of it . . . in the
unhallowed Union he has formed with the federalists. He pre-
tends to be a republican, and yet is supported by the Essex
Junto, who but yesterday plotted the separation of the states.”
Out of blind ambition, Clinton chose to “rule in hell” with the
rest of the Essex Junto.42 Also clear, was the fact that the Essex
Junto and its evil designs would no longer apply exclusively to
dissidents from Massachusetts, New England, or the Federalist
Party.
Including members of Jefferson’s party in the Essex Junto did
not mean that young, antiwar Federalists such as Josiah Quincy
would escape the Democratic-Republicans’ ire. In January
1813, Speaker of the House, Henry Clay of Kentucky seized the
opportunity to harangue Quincy during debates over military
appropriations. Quincy, one of the most provocative em-
bargo and war opponents in the House, accused Democratic-
Republicans of swaying public opinion against Britain in order
to hold onto seats in Congress, keep the “Monticellian dy-
nasty” in the presidency, and justify the allocation of funds for
an ill-conceived war. Clay rebuked Quincy for spouting views
of the “pack set loose from the Essex kennel.” He was not
42De Witt Clinton, Speech of the Hon. De Witt Clinton, in the Senate of the State of
New York, on Tuesday January 31, 1809 . . . (New York: Henry C. Southwick, 1809),
pp. 17–19; Essex Register, 18 March 1809; National Advocate [New York], 21 October
1819; Milo [pseud.], Letters Addressed to a Friend at Pittsburg on the Character and
Conduct of De Witt Clinton, Esq. (New York: Ptd. & Pub., 1812), pp. 5–8, 15.
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Dewitt Clinton (1769–1828)
Generally remembered for the Erie Canal while
governor of N.Y. (1817–23 and 1825–28), Clinton
ran for president in 1812 as a Democratic-
Republican with Federalist support and was asso-
ciated with the Essex Junto and the disunionism
that he previously rejected. Courtesy of the U.S.
Senate Historical Office, Library of Congress.
from Essex County, but Clay predicted that Americans would
inscribe Quincy “in the treasonable annals of a certain junto
. . . conspirators against the integrity of the Union.”43
Quincy often mentioned disunion as a possible consequence
for the sectional hostility that Democratic-Republicans accom-
panied the passage of restrictions on maritime trade and the
war. He consistently championed New England’s interests and
corresponded with Fisher Ames and Timothy Pickering while
in Congress, but never dictated or controlled the Federalist
Party. On the contrary, it was not unusual for him to act against
the advice of Federalists colleagues, such as when he proposed
and then cast a single vote to impeach Jefferson. To political
43Annals, 12th Cong., 2d sess. 552, 553, 564; Henry Clay, The Papers of Henry Clay,
eds. James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, 11 vols. (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1959) 1:759–83.
UNDERSTANDING THE ESSEX JUNTO 645
adversaries like Clay opposition to the embargo and criticisms
of Jeffersonians left no doubt that Quincy was a degenerate,
disloyal politician who was by all appearances affiliated with
the junto. After the war Democratic-Republicans continued to
invoke the illusive Essex Junto to silence dissent. In 1820, Clay
complained that “the predilection of the school of the Essex
Junto for foreign trade and British Fabrics” fostered opposition
to a tariff bill. Even though the Federalist Party was beginning
to deteriorate, as in the past, Clay found it convenient to sum-
mon the Essex Junto in order to discredit an opponent. This
time it was Massachusetts Federalist Ezekiel Whitman.44
No matter how often Democratic-Republicans used the Es-
sex Junto to turn public opinion against them, Quincy, Pickering
and other Federalists refused to scale back their opposition to
the war, stifle threats of disunion, or allow Democratic Repub-
licans to operate with impunity. Yet, moderate Federalists like
Harrison Gray Otis of Boston moved to distance themselves
from the radicals. Otis denied that the Essex Junto existed and
dismissed rumors that “an Essex or a Boston Junto” controlled
the Federalist Party as “eternal nonsense.” But in spite of plans
to advance his career in national politics, it was difficult to erase
decades of conspiracy theories, and then impossible when Otis
and other Federalists participated in the Hartford Convention.
Though insisting that he took part in the convention to ease po-
tentially riotous tensions in Massachusetts, neither Otis nor any
other Hartford Convention delegate could escape the stigma of
Essex Junto disunionism.45
Throughout its history the Essex Junto was a bugbear at
best, but to political opponents the Hartford Convention con-
firmed that Federalists had been involved in the “treasonable
practices of the Essex Junto.” On the eve of the conven-
tion in December 1814, U.S. minister to France William H.
Crawford, a Democratic-Republican from Georgia, expected
44Annals, 9th Cong., 1st sess. 1035–42, 10th Cong., 2d sess. 1173–82, & 16th Cong.,
1st sess. 2049, 2050; Clay, Papers, 1:759 & 2:843; Robert A. McCaughey, Josiah Quincy,
1772–1864: The Last Federalist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 54–
56.
45Banner, Hartford Convention, pp. 51, 303, 354.
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“Boston editors . . . [who] promulgate the views of the Essex
Junto” to sway Americans against the war. Crawford, a future
Secretary of the War and Treasury departments was convinced
that the situation was ripe for the Essex Junto, even if largely
confined to New England, to destroy the Union.46
In an effort to put a less menacing face on the Hartford
Convention, organizers banned hotspurs such as Pickering
and Quincy from open participation. However, the precau-
tion proved ineffective against charges of conspiring against
the government. The Baltimore Patriot and Evening Advertiser
reported that Convention delegate George Cabot, who other
Federalists considered a moderate, had been “a distinguished
member of the Essex Junto” for some time. The Patriot then
said that the Hartford Convention delegates assembled “with
the ingenuity of a malignant band of savages and cutthroats.”
But that was just the beginning. One of the Convention’s res-
olutions called for repeal of the three-fifths clause. For issuing
a demand pertaining to slavery, the Alexandria Herald said if
the Essex Junto held its Convention “in any other country than
this,” its participants “would have been punished as traitors.”47
When the Hartford Convention linked all of the New En-
gland states to the Federalists’ condemnation of the three-fifths
clause, the junto experienced the final evolution in its develop-
ment. Northerners’ growing opposition to slavery created a new
reason for politicians to evoke the Essex Junto. As opposition
to slavery and its expansion into new western territories esca-
lated, northern Democratic-Republicans were at the forefront
of antislavery politics. Apathetic or prosouthern New Yorkers
saw this as proof that the Essex Junto had finally managed to
infiltrate and divide their party. In fact, the growth of aboli-
tionism moved many to assert that the junto had corrupted
every northern and northwestern state. Lines needed to be
drawn, and any political “amalgamation” with Federalists or
46William H. Crawford to Henry Clay, December 12, 1814, William Harris Craw-
ford Papers, The Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Ky.
47Baltimore Patriot and Evening Advertiser, 30 November 1814; Baltimore Patriot,
5 June 1815; The Alexandria Herald, 9 October 1815.
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anyone expressing their divisive sentiments regarding slavery
rejected.48
Clinton’s alliance with Federalists had represented more than
the transgressions of a powerful New York politician just as the
Hartford Convention transcended the radicals’ antiwar protests.
Both signaled the likelihood that northerners regardless of po-
litical affiliation would unite to fight the spread of slavery and
growth of southern political power. Southerners understand-
ably found the prospect troubling. Too many northerners al-
ready seemed to concur with Federalists that the three-fifths
clause was unjust and the spread of slavery a threat to liberty.49
Proslavery politicians, North and South, condemned any move-
ment involving the abolition of slavery or placing limits on its
expansion as a threat to the Union instigated by the Essex Junto.
As far back as 1808, a few months before his death, Gover-
nor Sullivan charged Federalists with attacking slavery in order
to separate New England from the slaveholding states, and
leave the South “to provide for its Negroes” alone. Congres-
sional Federalists had opposed slavery’s expansion into new
territories well before the issue finally exploded during de-
bates over Missouri’s admission into the Union. The prob-
lem originated when New York Democratic-Republican James
Tallmadge, who also happened to be a Clintonite, proposed
banning slavery from Missouri as a condition for statehood.
Southerners responded with threats of disunion and allegations
that Tallmadge’s proposal originated with the Essex Junto. The
Albany Angus claimed that the Essex Junto initiated the Mis-
souri crisis to spark “serious contention between the northern
and southern interests, which would terminate in a separation
of the states.”50
By this time, however, the Bucktail faction of New York
Democratic-Republican Party, led by future president Martin
48Weekly Aurora [Philadelphia], 13 July 1818.
49Republican Watch-Tower [N.Y.], 13 September 1808; Albany Argus, 18 April
1820.
50James Sullivan to Jefferson, 2 and 5 April 1808, Jefferson Papers; Daniel Walker
Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 147; Albany Angus, 18 April 1820.
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Van Buren had wrested control away from the Clintonites. In
Congress, Bucktails voted consistently with the South and tried
to silence opponents of slavery by connecting them to the Essex
Junto. New York Federalists responded that they had never
been part of the Essex Junto. Just as Bucktails did not speak
for all Democratic-Republicans, if the Essex Junto existed, it
did not represent every Federalist.51 Nonetheless, southerners
and their northern supporters continued to accuse the Essex
Junto of sparking the Missouri controversy to disrupt sectional
harmony as it did during Jefferson’s presidency. As tensions
mounted, Daniel Webster and other New England Federalists
submitted a memorial to Congress demanding that slavery be
excluded from Missouri and every new state entering the Union
thereafter. As a consequence, the Portsmouth Gazette accused
Webster of conspiring with the Essex Junto and asserted that
for this reason he could not be trusted.52
Before entering Congress in 1813, Webster had been an
ardent opponent of Jefferson’s embargo. He questioned its
constitutionality and published accusations that Democratic-
Republicans never intended for the embargo to protect com-
merce. Then, during the War of 1812, Webster was at the fore-
front of a congressional investigation that examined the validity
of evidence used as the basis for declaring war in 1812. Later
in his career Webster became a Whig, was appointed secretary
of state by three presidents, and notoriously supported com-
promises on the spread of slavery in order to preserve sectional
harmony.53
Webster appeared to repudiate his Federalist past. Northern-
ers who once applauded his audacity complained that Webster
51Richards, Slave Power, pp. 120–27; Columbian [N.Y.], 20 August 1819, and 18
October 1820.
52Franklin Monitor and Middlesex Republican, 18 March 1820; Albany Argus, 18
April 1820; Portsmouth Gazette, 4 January 1825; Daniel Webster, et al., Memorial to
the Congress of the United States, on the Subject of Restraining the Increase of Slavery
in New States to be Admitted into the Union (Boston: Sewell Phelps, 1819), pp. 4, 6–8.
53Daniel Webster, Consideration of the Embargo Laws (Boston: n.p., 1808), pp.
4–6; J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early
American Republic 1783–1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 304–
309; Richards, Slave Power, pp. 110, 111; David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848–
1861 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976), pp. 101–102.
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had become an advocate for the South and should not count
on getting support from either section of the country.54 Over-
all, the past haunted Webster from both sides, but most often
from Democrats or Democratic-Republicans. Despite shedding
his radicalism and adopting a nationalist image during his run
for president as the Whig Party candidate in 1835, the Rhode-
Island Republican could not let the past die. While “the Godlike
senator of Massachusetts” might be considered great by some
voters, “So was Timothy Pickering, so is Harrison Gray Otis
and many others of that renowned fraternity, the Essex Junto.”
The paper predicted that Webster’s support would come solely
from Massachusetts, and then only from “Hartford Convention
and Essex Junto Federalists.” As predicted, when the election
of 1836 was over, Webster’s only electoral votes came from
Massachusetts. For several years after the election, political
foes would revive the Essex Junto to make sure that Ameri-
cans would never forget his past and allow Webster to become
president.55
Webster had called slavery a moral evil during the conflict
over the embargo, and the junto followed him for the rest of his
career. He was dubbed “tool” and “head of the Essex junto,”
and part of the junto through “breeding and adhesion,” well
into the 1840s. Any supporters of the National Republicans or
Whigs were included in denunciations of Webster. Proslavery
politicians branded those who opposed the spread of slavery
Essex Junto disunionists, but during the next four decades,
northern politicians found it increasingly difficult to win elec-
tions if they openly supported the spread of slavery. Former
New York governor Daniel D. Tompkins, James Monroe’s Vice
President, was forced to refute charges that he was pro-slavery.
Supporters brandished his antislavery credentials and boasted
that at one time Tompkins recommended “absolute abolition”
54Jabez D. Hammond, A Letter to the Hon. Daniel Webster [Dated March 20,
1850, on Slavery] (Cherry Valley: Gazette Office, 1850), pp. 4, 6–8; An unsigned copy
is located in the Martin Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress.
55Rhode-Island Republican, 28 January 1835; New-Hampshire Patriot and State
Gazette, 30 April 1827 and 23 April 1841; U.S. Congress, Senate Journal, 24th Cong.,
2d sess., 8 February 1837, p. 227; The Ohio Statesman, 29 September 1840.
650 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY
in New York, and “relieved whole families of colored people
from slavery, by purchasing their freedom.”56
Clearly, the Essex Junto continued to surface in political
discourse and propaganda long after the Federalist Party dis-
banded in 1824. Southern and northern Democrats held the
Essex Junto responsible for deepening northern hostility to
slavery. As several threads of antislavery sentiment combined to
form the Liberty and Free Soil parties, including free labor ad-
vocates and political abolitionists, northern voters began to elect
antislavery politicians to state and national offices. Tensions in
Congress thickened when representatives or senators criticized
slavery, even in abstract terms, and southerners still blamed
the Essex Junto for causing the sectional divide.57 In this cli-
mate, even John Quincy Adams who parted with Federalists
over the embargo could not escape involuntary induction into
the Essex Junto. As the presidential election of 1824 drew near,
Andrew Jackson, southerner by birth, westerner by choice, and
an expansionist slaveholder through ingenuity, was the popular
favorite. Adams, on the other hand, was a former Federalist,
and Jackson’s supporters could breed mistrust based on his for-
mer political affiliations. In no time they dubbed Adams, “poet
Laureate to the Essex Junto.”58
Adams was annoyed that “newspapers of extensive circulation
published in various parts of the Union acting in close con-
cert with each other” were “pouring fourth continual streams
of slander upon my character and reputation, public and pri-
vate.” Friends in New England tried to distance him from
the propaganda by casting his election as a unifying event.
Democratic-Republican and former Secretary of the Navy,
Benjamin Crowninshield, ironically a resident of Salem in
Essex County, received a letter expressing the importance of
56New Hampshire Gazette, 4 January 1825; Eastern Argus, 18 December, 1827;
New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, 18 August 1834; Albany Argus, 18 April
1820 [Italics theirs]; Wiskonian Enquirer, 13 March 1841; New-Hampshire Patriot and
State Gazette, 1 December 1842.
57Richards, Slave Power, pp. 134–38; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, p. 652.
58Essex Register, 11 September 1823; Augusta Chronicle and Georgia Advertiser,
18 June 1823; Independent Chronicle and Boston Patriot, 7 May 1823; Eastern Argus
[Portland], 18 October 1824.
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an Adams’ victory. If John C. Calhoun of South Carolina and
Andrew Jackson “are friendly to a union of the Republican
Party & wish to defeat the intrigues and effects of the radicals”
the letter admonished that they stop opposing Adams and the
“cause of the North.” Adams won every New England state
except Vermont, and received 26 of New York’s 36 electoral
votes. Following his lackluster presidency, he lost his bid for
reelection in 1828. But even in defeat Adams won every New
England State, 16 of New York’s votes, and carried New Jersey,
Delaware, and Maryland—states that he lost in 1824.59
One of Adams’s many mistakes during his presidency was of-
fering Dewitt Clinton the ambassadorship to Great Britain and
then appointing Federalist Rufus King to the post when Clinton
declined. King’s appointment gave Adams’s enemies enough in-
formation to claim that he was colluding with the Essex Junto.
Even after his loss to Jackson, Democrats insisted that both
John Quincy and his father had been in bed with the Essex
Junto. At times, the Democratic press even accused slavehold-
ers such as Henry Clay, William Henry Harrison, and Zachary
Taylor of being pawns of the Essex Junto. Before the 1840
election, Democrats described Harrison as “pretty much of a
granny,” who had “silly notions about Negroes.” They claimed
everything his Federalist supporters, like Josiah Quincy, had
done since Jefferson’s election was meant to turn Americans
against the slave South. Democrats associated Harrison with
the Essex Junto but failed to bring about his defeat. They did,
however, show a propensity for exploiting Americans’ fears to
preserve slavery and win elections.60
59John Quincy Adams, The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794–1845, ed. Allan
Nevins (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), p. 327; Independent Chronicle and
Boston Patriot, 22 October 1824; Statesman [Newburyport], 22 August 1808; Indepen-
dent Federalists of Lincoln, Congressional Election September 8, 1823 . . . Broadside
Collection, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.; M. Corham[?] to Ben-
jamin Crowninshield, 17 July 1824, Crowninshield Family Papers, Philips Library,
Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.; Annals, 18th Cong., 2d sess. 149 and 20th
Cong., 2d sess. 120.
60Hartford Times, 21 May 1832; Macon Georgia Telegraph, 15 October 1839; Pitts-
field Sun, 17 September 1840; Macon Georgia Telegraph, 15 October 1839; Howe,
What Hath God Wrought, pp. 146, 147; New-Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, 18
August 1834 and 12 October 1848.
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By the 1830s, the mainstream politicians most susceptible to
Essex Junto propaganda belonged to the Whig Party, because
many of its members were former Federalists and anti-Jackson
Democrats. After becoming a Whig, Henry Clay’s words came
back to haunt him as his former party mates lumped him in
with the “kennel of the Essex Junto,” and when the new party
rose in prominence, they were disparaged as “the same men
under a new name . . . trying to secure the aid of abolitionists
against the South.” If they supported Whigs or belong to the
party, even southern and western Whigs could count on iden-
tification with the junto and those who “called for disunion or
abolition.”61
As the national debate over slavery intensified, Democrats
announced, “The Essex Junto are yet alive!” If the South se-
ceded, their contention was that the junto was to blame. Several
newspapers including the Daily Missouri Republican argued
that the “doctrine of the right of secession originated with the
Essex Junto.” The Pittsfield Sun rationalized that northern abo-
litionism, which instead of slavery was tearing the nation apart,
was also a creation of the Essex Junto and Hartford Conven-
tion. Politicians of this ilk, the Sun continued, “were the first
disturbers of the Constitutional Compromise,” the three-fifths
clause, and had “called for disunion or [the] abolition of slave
representation . . . as the modern Abolitionists do now.” When
making a similar comparison, the mordant article, “A Bad Breed
of Children to Adopt” published in the Barre Gazette, declared
that leading abolitionist Wendell Phillips had merely “taken
up and clothed the apparently discarded intellectual children
of . . . the Essex Junto.”62
Try as they might Democrats could not discredit the antislav-
ery politicians by attacking them with the Essex Junto. Amer-
icans could plainly see that despite northerners’ willingness to
61The Hartford Times, 21 May 1832; Macon Georgia Telegraph, 15 October 1839;
Pittsfield Sun, 17 September 1840.
62Eastern Argus [Portland], 1 March 1831; Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion!: The
Coming of the American Civil War, 1789–1859 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2008), pp. 32, 33; Daily Missouri Republican, 14 January 1851; Pittsfield
Sun, 17 September 1840; Barre Gazette 18 June 1847.
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accept compromises and gag rules, southerners, amid violent
outbursts were the ones threatening to secede from the Union,
and did so to protect slavery. By referencing the Essex Junto,
Democratic-Republicans successfully defamed New England’s
dying Federalist Party, but by the late 1840s, the opponents of
slavery had a broad, expanding base of support. With attacks
on slavery emanating from almost every region of the nation
except the South, attempts to intimidate antislavery politicians
by evoking the Essex Junto were futile. More than half of the
United States was developing an antipathy towards slavery that
had once condemned the junto. When this transformation took
place the Essex Junto no longer induced panic or damaged
political careers as it had in the past.
Secession and civil war ended both chattel slavery and the
three-fifths clause. Still, the Essex Junto managed to limp into
the literature of the post-Civil War years. The term surfaced in
books, newspapers and journal articles, but without its former
relevance. This was obvious during Reconstruction, when the
Idaho Tri-Weekly Statesman asked, “Why should the conspir-
acy of the Calhoun Junto (secession) bring greater punishment
on its innocent victims than the Essex Junto and its Hartford
Convention?”63
When Congress began to archive its public records at the
end of the nineteenth century, it attempted to define the Essex
Junto. Despite its long and diverse history, however, the gov-
ernment determined that the term was a “synonym for New
England Federalism.” Ames, Cabot, Lowell, Higginson, and
Pickering are listed “among prominent members of the Essex
Junto,” and John Quincy Adams is counterpoised as a critic
of junto “policy and principles.” Among these policies was a
strong central government and “protection of the commercial
interests of the country.” But the archive fails to explain why
the politicians, propagandists, and political writers of the pe-
riod connected Josiah Quincy, John Adams, Harrison Gray Otis,
John Quincy Adams, DeWitt Clinton, and Daniel Webster to
63Galveston Flake’s Bulletin, 2 May 1866; Idaho Tri-Weekly Statesman, 24 April
1866.
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Daniel Webster (1782–1852)
Webster of N.H. entered Congress as a Federal-
ist (1813–16), relocated and represented Mass. in
the House and Senate (1823–50). Webster ran for
president as a Whig in 1836 when former asso-
ciation with the Federalist Party linked him to the
Essex Junto. Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical
Office, Library of Congress.
the Essex Junto.64 The government’s most startling omissions
are the disunionism, repeal of the three-fifths clause, and anti-
slavery politics that politicos ascribed to the Essex Junto.
Attempts to classify the Essex Junto with secret societies, like
the Illuminati and Freemasons help to explain why its signifi-
cance was lost by the early twentieth century. While it provided
no explanation, an article looking at historic presidential tours
of the nation concluded that encountering the Essex Junto was
the major difference between the tours taken by Presidents
McKinley and Taft, and those of Monroe and Jackson. Six
64James D. Richardson, The Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, 1789–1897 20 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 10:
350.
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decades later, the junto resurfaced in a 1968 piece about anti-
Vietnam War protests. The article concluded that at one time
the Essex Junto posed a more serious threat to the nation than
Vietnam War protesters.65 Although this conclusion is essen-
tially correct, because no single group of politicians formed the
Essex Junto, references to the reveals the term’s longevity as a
critique of politicians who espoused controversial positions.
What these writings overlook is the relationship between the
insecurities and fears that sired the Essex junto and the con-
troversies that gave it its vitality. From the beginning, the junto
was shaped by anxieties over preserving republican government
and the Union. Suspicions of disloyalty were easily cast upon
politicians who represented the same economic class and re-
gion, especially when they expressed similar perspectives and
voted the same way in Congress. As Robert Treat Paine of
Massachusetts explained in 1776, it only took “2, 3, or 4 men”
appearing to vote uniformly to convince members of the Con-
tinental Congress that a junto was poised to destroy “everyone
who will not comply with their mode of conduct.”66 The Essex
Junto tapped into Americans’ fears and surfaced like a monster
springing from the shadows in times of adversity. Though no
single Essex County politician controlled the Federalist Party,
what the Essex Junto symbolized was very real in Americans’
minds and experiences. At key intervals after the Revolution the
republic was in jeopardy, but in the end survived secession and
civil war. Through its frequent appearances in sensationalized
speeches, prose, and poetry during the most dynamic periods
in U.S. history, the Essex Junto emerged as a testament to
political uncertainty.
Even though it transcended geographic boundaries, traversed
partisan divides, and experienced modifications over time, the
Essex Junto never lost its original contours. Politicians resusci-
tated the Essex Junto when they needed to strike fear in the
65Morning Herald [Lexington], 12 May 1901; San Jose Mercury Evening News, 18
October 1909; Sunday Herald Traveler [Boston], 29 September 1968.
66Fischer, American Conservatism, p. 235; Hofstadter, Paranoid Style, p. 11; Robert
Treat Paine to Joseph Palmer 1 January 1776, Letters of Delegates, 3:11.
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public mind to silence opposition to unpopular policies, end an-
tiwar protests, or halt the spread of antislavery sentiment. Yet,
each time it resurfaced those associated with the Essex Junto
grew more impenitent and references to the junto proved less
provocative. As the spread of slavery united Americans against
an insidious, real enemy, politicians embraced the attributes
that identified the Essex Junto without apologizing. Voters dis-
regarded attempts to smear antislavery candidates with Essex
Junto propaganda, and many praised Federalists for their un-
compromising spirit. In the end, we can understand the Essex
Junto as a propaganda tool, the excrescence of a polity in flux,
and a reflection of fundamental flaws in the republic that could
not be diminished passively.67
67McInnis and Nelson, Shaping the Body Politic, p. 37.
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